NOROUZI LLC
FORT LAUDERDALE, FLORIDA

[Anglo-Iranian Oil Company] It may well be advisable for the United States to indicate support of the Mosadeq Government. By increasing Dr. Mosadeq�s confidence in U.S. efforts to assist Iran we may well bring his Government to cooperate in implementing our programs here. His aims, while presently vague in definition and detail, are basically similar to ours in removing economic and political causes for discontent which allow present opportunities for Communist activity. Furthermore, by developing cooperation with Mosadeq we may be able to guide him toward working out an equitable settlement on the oil question in negotiation with the British. Further, our assistance and advice can surely help him to gain a clearer understanding of present issues in Iran and their complications. Our support, advice and possibly economic assistance could also contribute towards maintaining Dr. Mosadeq free from domination of the radical leftist elements which have had some influence on him in the past. [Annotations by Arash Norouzi] It�s like looking at an imperial power in a semi-colonial situation. The ambassador acts basically like a viceroy, involved in many different internal policy. He often says, "Oh, of course, it�s not my business to be involved in internal policy," but then he goes ahead and, in fact, does get involved. ERVAND ABRAHAMIAN: Yeah. But, actually, even there, what we�the conventional wisdom was you had the Truman administration, and then, when Eisenhower came in, the machinery is put for the coup, and it was the Eisenhower administration, with Kermit Roosevelt and Dulles, doing it. What these documents show, which is astounding, before Eisenhower, under the Truman administration, there was actually a deep state. And the deep state in the CIA were exactly Dulles and Kermit Roosevelt. They were in charge of the Iran desk in the CIA, long�from 1951, long before the Eisenhower [administration]. So they were pushing for real action in Iran before Eisenhower came in. And they were working very closely with the British before the Eisenhower administration. With essential help from our Iranian allies, we were able to expose Mossadegh�s effort to take over Iran. As the army and Iranian people became aware of this threat, they mobilized to support the shah. All that the United States contributed to this was the �trigger�, which consisted of myself and three other Americans and less than $100,000, although we had 10 times that amount available to us stashed in a safe the size of a large closet. This was no longer so in 1979. More and more, our embassy in Tehran lacked free access to informed Iranians. Savak, the security service originally trained by the United States after 1953, had established a tight and discreet control over all U.S. Embassy contact with Iranians. Our embassy heard only what Savak wanted it to hear, though private Americans � businessmen and tourists � would often hear quite different stories from their own contacts. The shah for some reason was spared this ultimate ignominy, and was sent with his family into exile. There he received much the same kind of treatment from those who had been, and presumably still were, his friends. The United States, in my opinion, behaved particularly badly — one might even say abominably. The only friend who acted like a friend was President Anwar Sadat of Egypt, who received him warmly and did his best to provide circumstances in which the shah could, at last and at least, die in dignity. “Why did we, our government, help overthrow Mossadegh in 1953? It had to do with oil. So our foreign policy is designed to protect our oil interests.”